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CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE
MENTALLY ILL IN NEBRASKA
One out of every twelve persons in the United States will spend
a portion of his life in a mental hospital.' The problems arising out
of this situation are not entirely medical. Institutionalization of
those suffering from mental disorders is necessarily a social concern which requires the attention and involvement of our courts
and legislatures. However, until recently, mental illness and its
related legal problems has been one of the backwaters of American
law. Commenting on this fact, one authority has said:
[Tlhe failure of this field to get its due legal attention can primarily be explained by the absence of a moving force behind
it. Unfortunately the "insanity" field was deprived of its most

powerful lobby through a process of human erosion, in2 institutions where cure was the exception rather than the rule.

Paradoxically, medical knowledge in the care and treatment of the
mentally ill is expanding rapidly. Advancements in these areas,
which cut to the core of theories regarding commitment to mental
hospitals, would seem to demand a periodic re-evaluation of such
commitment procedures in order to utilize these gains. This is

particularly true in view of shifting social attitudes towards infringement upon individual freedom in all forms.
One aspect of the law concerning mental illness presents a
question that is basic to American legal thought and is particularly
pertinent at the present time where there has been a judicial
emphasis on human rights within our constitutional system. Proceedings in which persons are involuntarily committed to mental
hospitals have historically been deemed "civil" in nature.3 However, these proceedings can result in the detention of an individual
against his will for an indefinite period of time. Recent judicial decisions evidence a blurring of distinction between civil and criminal
actions in this area with emphasis moving from the theories underlying the action to the resulting disposition of the case. 4 In the
past this labeling has been used as justification for the lax application of procedural safeguards in civil commitment procedures. This
I

REPORT OF =HAmIcIAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DIsABLED
AND THE LAW 1 (Lindman and McIntyre ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited

as Lindman and McIntyre].

2 Kittrie, Compulsory Mental

Treatment and the Requirements of "Due
Process", 21 Omo ST. L. J. 28, 29 (1960).
3 Sorter v. Austen, 221 Ala. 481, 129 So. 51 (1930); Commonwealth v.

Bechtel, 384 Pa. 184, 120 A.2d 295 (1956).
4 Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965) (mental illness); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency).
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solution does not adequately answer the problems facing us in
this area. While considering a case of involuntary commitment, a
New York court pointedly observed that "[i]ncarceration, whether
called hospitalization or by some other euphemism, means depriving a person of liberty. No matter how sweetly disguised or delicate the language, involuntary confinement is a loss of freedom." 5

The authority of the state to restrain a mentally ill person has its
historical basis in the sovereign's police power to prevent destructive acts." Commitment would seem a valid exercise of the power
where a person, as a result of a mental disorder, presents a danger
either to himself or to the community. A second standard for commitment, "in need of care and treatment," has been developed in
order to justify the detention of an individual who does not evidence dangerous tendencies as the result of his mental affliction.
This theory, first expounded by Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the Matter of Josiah Oakes,7 has been
viewed as an extension of the ancient doctrine of parens patriae
that envisioned the state as the father of its deranged children. 8
While the state may have the authority to commit its citizens
to mental hospitals, this situation presents difficult policy considerations as to when this power should be exercised and to what
extent. It has been argued that the non-dangerous individual
should be allowed to select his own method of treatment for his
illness without state intervention. This position, however, overlooks
the fact that by the very nature of his illness the mentally ill
5 In re Neisloss, 8 Misc.2d 912, 913, 171 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (Westchester
County Ct. 1957). Nor is loss of freedom the only consequence resulting from a civil commitment proceeding. Nm. REv. STAT. § 38-202
(Reissue 1960) indicates that commitment to a mental hospital carries an automatic adjudication of incompetency and provides for the
appointment of a guardian for the individual's estate.
6 Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,
79 HARv. L. REV. 1288 (1966); Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment
and the Requirements of "Due Process", 21 OHmo ST. L. J.28 (1960).
7 8 Law Rptr. 122 (Mass. 1845).
8 Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
822 (1967). There have been many critics of the quality of psychiatric
aid in state institutions that are overcrowded and understaffed. This
situation presents an interesting question. If a non-dangerous mentally ill person is committed on the theory that he is in need of
treatment and care and if he fails because of these conditions to
receive such treatment, is he being illegally held? See Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) where the court held that a
committed patient had a statutory right to treatment and strongly
implied that, even in the absence of a statute, failure to receive treatment destroyed the basis for commitment and constituted an infringement upon due process rights.
9 Lindman and McIntyre 20.

COMMENTS
individual may no longer be capable of a rational decision as to
whether he is in need of psychiatric attention. We have here the
state's interest in the maintenance of mental health weighed against
individual liberty. The wisdom of confinement for one's "own
good" must be questioned in light of basic tenets of the American
political heritage which stress minimum interference by the state
with individual rights and a belief in the maximum of personal
freedom. While it is not the purpose of this article to discuss in
depth the theories underlying commitment proceedings, it can be
seen from this brief examination that the problems in this area
cannot be solved by reference to meaningless labels or archaic
legal theory.
As in many instances in which the disciplines of medicine and
law overlap, competing theories are present. One area of conflict
between medical men and legal authorities arises with respect
to the nature of the proceeding itself. Lawyers emphasize the need
for legal protections to guard against the "railroading" of sane
individuals into mental institutions. 10 Medical men, on the other
hand, are concerned with the possible traumatic effect of too much
legal formality and the delay this formality causes in the treatment
of a mentally ill patient." To a certain extent Nebraska procedures
for the civil commitment of the mentally ill reflect this conflict.
The purpose of this article is to examine the Nebraska procedure
with an emphasis on those "due process" protections normally
afforded those whose liberty is in danger.
NEBRASKA PROCEDURES
In Nebraska there are three methods by which a person suffering from a mental disorder can be admitted to a state mental hospital: voluntary admission, medical certification, and involuntary
commitment.' 3 Voluntary admissions will not be discussed in this
article. 14 While actual compulsion may not exist in commitment by
10 Most authorities agree that instances where a sane individual is committed to an institution are rare. M. GUTTMAcmm AND H. WEmorsN,
PsYcHiTRY AND THE LAW 297 (1952). However, such cases do occa-

sionally come to the attention of the courts. See Shields v. Shields,
26 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Mo. 1939).

11 M. GuTnu&cHER

AND

H. WEIHoFEN, PsYcHIATRY

AND

THE

LAW

288

(1952).

U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
'3 Voluntary admission-NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-324 (Reissue 1966); Medical Certification-NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-322.01 (Reissue 1966); Involuntary Commitment-NEB. REv. STAT. § § 83-325 to 83-328 (Reissue
12

1966), as amended, (Supp. 1967).

14 Also excluded from this discussion are procedures concerning the
commitment of sexual psychopaths under NEB. REV. STAT. § § 29-2901
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medical certification, for the purposes of examining the rights of
individuals under such a provision, it should be considered as invol15
untary.
Under section 83-322.01 of the Nebraska procedure, any person
shown to be mentally ill by certification of two physicians may be
admitted to any public or private hospital for the treatment of
such mental illness by the superintendent of such hospital upon
the written request of any family member, near relative, friend
with whom he resides, or an officer of any charitable institution or
agency. The person subject to such commitment or anyone in
his behalf may make a written request for his release to the
superintendent. The request will be complied with unless the superintendent is of the opinion that further detention is warranted, in
which case he shall request the county board of mental health of
the person's home county to institute involuntary proceedings
against him.
Involuntary commitments are under the jurisdiction of the
county boards of mental health. 16 Application for the admission
to a state hospital must be filed with the board by any interested
party. The information must allege belief that the person for
whom admission is sought is mentally ill and a fit subject for custody and treatment in a state hospital."' The board then holds a
preliminary inquiry at which it hears such testimony, concerning
the mental condition of the proposed patient, that it deems necessary
and desirable.'" A physician is appointed to examine the patient
and to certify his mental condition to the board. 19 A hearing may
then be held at which the board, upon consideration of the evidence, finds: (1) whether the allegedly mentally ill person is in
to 29-2907 (Reissue 1964) and the commitment of the mentally retarded under NEB. REV. STAT. § § 83-220 to 83-222 (Supp. 1967).
15 When faced with the possibility of commitment to a mental hospital,
an individual is likely to be confused as to the nature of his situation or overwhelmed by family or friends seeking to give advice as
to his best course of action. The fact that the patient stands mute in
such a case should not be construed as meaning he voluntarily accepts
hospitalization. Also, such statutes are usually vague or noncommittal
as to what degree of force may be used to compel entrance and as
to the legal ability of the person to protest the admission at that
time. Lindman and McIntyre 17.
16 These boards are appointed by the district court of the county. The
membership consists of a lawyer, a physician, and the clerk of the
district court as an ex officio member. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-317 (Reissue 1966).
17 NE. REV. STAT. § 83-323 (Reissue 1966).
18 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-325 (Supp. 1967).
19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-326 (Reissue 1966). The examing physician may
be a member of the board. Only one Dhysician is reauiredL

COMMENTS
fact mentally ill; and if so, (2) whether he should be admitted to
a state hospital. 20 Under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-328,
commitment by the county board is final only upon certification
within sixty days by the hospital superintendent that the person
is or is not mentally ill. Appeal procedures for review of the board's
decision by the district court are provided.2 1
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITMENT
Both procedures by which an individual may be committed
22
to a mental hospital in Nebraska are of a nonjudicial nature.
The delegation of the power to deprive an individual of his freedom
to an administrative body, and in the case of medical certification,
23
to physicians, raises questions of constitutional dimensions.
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-320, the Nebraska Legislature vests
the jurisdiction over commitment proceedings in a county board
of mental health.24 While the courts recognize the authority of the
legislature to create quasi-judicial power, they also apply certain
requirements limiting such delegation. First, definite standards
or guidelines for the implementation of the desired policy must be
25
established by the legislature for the administrative

agency.

Secondly, review of any decision of such agency must be provided.26
20

§ 83-328 (Supp. 1967).
§ 83-328.02 (Reissue 1966).
Nebraska is one of twelve states in which only nonjudicial commitment is available. Thirty-one others have some form of such nonjudicial confinement of the mentally ill. Lindman and McIntyre 30.
The Federal Constitution requires only that administrative procedure
be regulated by sufficient safeguards as to insure that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment is satisfied. Graves v. Minnesota,
272 U.S. 425 (1926); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The
Nebraska Constitution, however, provides that "[tihe Powers of this
state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative,
executive, and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being
NEB.REV.

STAT.

21 NEB.REv. STAT.

22

23

24

25

26

of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the other, except as hereinafter expressly
directed or permitted." NEB. CoNsT. art. H, § 1.
This procedure was found to be constitutional in Iowa. County of
Blackhawk v. Springer, 58 Ia. 417, 10 N.W. 791 (1882). The power
of administrative boards to constitutionally invade individual liberty
has also been established in somewhat analagous situations. Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (selective service boards); In re
McGee, 105 Kan. 574, 185 P. 14 (1919) (quarantine for contagious
disease). See also Note, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement,
3 Stan. L. Rev. 109 (1950-51).
School District No. 39 of Washington County v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693,
68 N.W.2d 354 (1955); Block v. Lincoln Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 170 Neb. 531, 103 N.W.2d 312 (1960).
Auburn v. Eastern Nebraska Public Power District, 179 Neb. 439, 138
N.W.2d 629 (1965).
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The county boards of mental health must then move within a
defined framework provided by the legislature. However, as one
authority points out, statutes in the area of civil commitment are
almost universally obscure.2 7 The provisions are so broadly worded
that they fail to identify with sufficient clarity the type or degree
of mental illness for which involuntary hospitalization is justified.
In Nebraska mental illness is defined only in terms of origin. 28
The board is required to find only (1) whether the person alleged
to be mentally ill is mentally ill and (2) if he should be admitted
to a state hospital. 29 No standards for the board's direction, such as
whether the patient evidences dangerous tendencies or is in need
of care and treatment, are included in the statutes covering this
area. The term "mentally ill" covers a vast field of abnormal behavior, particularly when open to interpretation by one not trained
80
in psychiatric medicine.
While more definite guidelines for the determination of who
should come under the commitment process should be required,
the broad discretion vested in the county boards at each step of
the proceeding would seem, in itself, to violate due process standards
for the delegation of power to administrative bodies. In the absence
of one board member, the remaining member may ask another
person to sit on the board with him.31 After the information is filed,
the board may proceed or dismiss the complaint. The board decides
whether the proposed patient should be detained prior to the hearing. It is within their discretion to dispense entirely with notice
of the pending hearing for the person subject to commitment and
27
28

Lindman and McIntyre 20.
"The term mentally ill, as used in this act, shall include persons
suffering from any type of mental illness whatsoever, whether hereditary or acquired by internal or external conditions, diseases, narcotics, alcoholic beverages, accident, or any other condition or happening." NE. REv. STAT. § 83-306 (Reissue 1966).

29 NEB.

REV.

STAT.

§ 83-328 (Reissue 1966).

30 With respect to standards for involuntary commitment, these provi-

sions have been suggested: "If, upon completion of the hearing and

consideration of the record, the court finds that the proposed patient
(1) is mentally ill, and
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others if
allowed to remain at liberty, or
(3) is in need of custody, care, or treatment in a mental hospital
and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his hospitalization. ... "

NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
A DRArT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL, § 9

(g) (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1951) [hereinafter cited as

31

Draft Act].
NE. REV. STAT. § 83-317 (Reissue 1966).

COMMENTS
they may decide whether or not he should be present at the hearing. There is no statutory command to the board that a hearing
should be held in each case. It seems rather to be assumed that one
will be held.3 2 At the hearing the board determines the ability of the
individual to obtain his own counsel. The physician on the board
may be the examining doctor in the case, thus making him both
the trier of fact and the witness.
In view of this statutory arrangement, it is not difficult to
imagine a situation where the medical member of the board, sitting with a friend, could commit an individual without notice,
without an opportunity to be heard, without a hearing, and with
himself as the examining physician.
Not only may the county board of mental health exercise wide
discretion in its eventual disposition of the case, but they also have
great leeway in determining every procedural step inherent in
the administrative hearing process. The latitude given the board in
these areas would seem to warrant the conclusion that Nebraska's
administrative commitment could be regarded by the courts as an
unlimited delegation of power and thus a violation of due process
standards.
Another requirement essential to the validity of administrative
orders is that adequate judicial review of such orders be provided.8s
Some authorities feel that such provisions will correct any defects
in the process and thus make it more likely to withstand constitutional attack. 84 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-917 regulating appeals from
administrative agencies, provides for review de novo without a jury.
This provision allows a complete examination into all pertinent
questions surrounding the commitment proceeding. An expanded
writ of habeas corpus is also available. With respect to the appeal
process, however, it should be noted that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-328
provides for an observational period of sixty days and confirmation
of the board's order by the hospital superintendent before the decision is final. While this provision adds a double check to commitment by the board, it also has the effect of delaying the appeal for
sixty days since only orders that are final are subject to appeal
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-917.
32

33

84

See Hearing and Notice, infra.
Auburn v. Eastern Nebraska Public Power District, 179 Neb. 439, 138
N.W.2d 629 (1965). Judicial attitudes toward the "saving grace" of
review proceedings will be discussed under Hearing and Notice, infra.
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy,
57 McIH. L. Ray. 945 (1959); Note, Constitutionality of Non-Judicial
Conftnement, 3 STAw L. REv. 109 (1950-51).
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While the use of an administrative agency in involuntary commitment proceedings may be within constitutional limits if proper
standards and procedures are outlined by the legislature, certain
considerations militate against its use. These boards are an example of attempts to place commitment proceedings in an informal
surrounding. Medical men argue that the use of this type of
procedure removes any stigma of criminality which might attach
to commitment by the judiciary. Formal judicial process can
allegedly be harmful to the patient in that it may cause adverse
psychological reactions in one already mentally ill. These reactions
may stem from confrontation in open court where the patient may
hear friends and relatives testifying as to his mental condition. It
is said that commitment procedures should be made as informal
as possible in order not to discourage an individual's family from
seeking early hospitalization when cure is more likely. Also some
medical authorities feel that mental illness is a medical problem
and as such only trained personnel are qualified to render judg35
ment in that area.
However, it has been said that:
The position of advocates of administrative hospitalization fails
to take into consideration the fact that the ultimate decision on
hospitalization is a social decision, rather than a medical one.
Physicians are no more qualified to balance individual rights
against the social policy of the state or its police power than are
other groups. In fact, physicians
may be less qualified than such
a group as the judiciary. 36
If informal procedures are indeed desirable for the benefit of the
patient, it would seem unnecessary to remove the courts from the
process. This result could be reached without depriving the person of his7 right of judicial determination of the question of his
3
freedom.
Perhaps the strongest consideration which militates against the
use of administrative boards is that while such relaxation may be
based on good intentions and directed for the benefit of the patient,
the resulting proceeding may be one in which expediency is valued
above individual rights. While it may be traumatic to a certain
extent for a mentally ill person to take part in a judicial hearing,
35 Curren, Hospitalization of the Mentally 11, 31 N. CAR. L. REV. 274
(1952-1953).

36 Lindman and McIntyre 31.
37 Draft Act § 9 (f) provides with respect to judicial procedures that
the hearing shall be conducted in as informal manner as may be
consistent with orderly procedures and that the court may receive
all relevant evidence which may be offered and is not bound by the
rules of evidence.

COMMENTS
it would seem equally traumatic to find oneself summarily committed to a state mental hospital.
HEARING AND NOTICE
It has been said that the minimum requirements necessary
to satisfy the constitutional mandate of due process of law are
notice and opportunity to be heard. 38 These requirements have
been extended to civil commitment proceedings. 39 However, it
would seem that these protections are not absolute in form. As
Justice Roberts said in Betts v. Brady: "That which may, in one
setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness... may in other
circumstances, and in light of other considerations, fall short of
such denial." 40 It is difficult to formulate definite standards under
such a concept for the examination of the process that has been
developed in Nebraska for the commitment of the mentally ill.
It is without doubt that many procedures in use today would
fall as being in violation of due process protections if strict interpretation were given the requirements of hearing, notice, and
opportunity to be heard 1 The departures from these elements of
"fundamental fairness" have been justified primarily in terms of
the welfare of the people who become involved in the process. Also
the courts make a distinction between civil actions and criminal
proceedings. Such justifications must be sound if such practices
are expected to withstand constitutional attack.
Certain jurisdictions have held that failure to give notice and
to allow an allegedly mentally ill person an opportunity to defend
is not fatal to a commitment proceeding. Two arguments are advanced: (1) that a substitute notice is given to someone on behalf
of the allegedly mentally ill person thus satisfying the requirement,42 and (2) that any due process defects in the original proceeding would be cured by subsequent review or other provisions
43
in the nature of an appeal.
Nebraska statutes in this area are somewhat unclear as to the
exact process required for civil commitment with respect to notice,
38

39

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1909).

40 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
41

Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397

42

(1966).
Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Payne v. Arkebauer,
190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76 (1935).

43

In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897); In re Crosswell,

28 R.I. 137, 66 A. 55 (1907). But see Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C.D.C.
1938) and In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 45 P. 726 (1896) both of

which insist on adequate notice to the individual.
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hearing, and opportunity to be heard. One authority, commenting
on the Nebraska procedure, has said:
The Nebraska statutes permit a patient to be hospitalized without his ever having had an opportunity to request or to have a
formal hearing. The board is not required to hold a hearing and
may make its decision ex parte. The patient's only opportunity to
be heard is through
a request for a review of his hospitalization
before a judge.44
No provision for notice appears in the statutes unless it is
assumed that the physician appointed by the board will serve as
adequate notice at the time he examines the patient. Those arguments advanced in support of informal commitment procedures
are also used to defend absence of notice, i.e., that it is traumatic
for a mentally ill person to receive notice that his mental condition is being adjudicated. However, the Kansas Court of Appeals
points to the fallacy of this position in In re Wellman,45 where it
says: "It will not do to say that it is useless to serve notice on an
insane person; that it would avail nothing because of his inability
to take advantage of it. His sanity is the very thing to be tried."
Failure to give notice prejudges the allegedly mentally ill person
prior to any contact with the commitment process.
It is suggested that the failure to provide notice to the proposed patient in Nebraska is not necessarily an oversight on the
part of the legislature, but rather reflects such concern in exposing
a mentally ill person to an adversary proceeding. There are, however, satisfactory alternatives to complete absence of notice. California has sought to minimize the adverse effects of such notice
by the use of mental health counselors who have the initial contact
with the allegedly mentally ill person, thus providing the desired
buffer between the individual and the judicial process which is to
follow. 46 Such substituted notice provisions may satisfy both due
process requirements and the objections to personal service on the
allegedly mentally ill individual.
Under present Nebraska procedures notice will not necessarily
reach the proposed patient either directly or in the form of substituted service. A hearing is optional at the discretion of the
county board of mental health. The presence of the individual,
assuming a hearing is held, is not provided for if, in the opinion
Lindman and McIntyre 32.
3 Kan. App. 100, 101, 45 P. 726, 727 (1896).
46 Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentaly 111, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
822, 837 (1967). The Washington statute in this area provides that
notice may be dispensed with for medical reasons only when the
notice is served on a court appointed guardian ad litem. WASHnGTON
REv. CODE 71.02.140.

44

45
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of the board, such presence would be injurious to the patient. Since
the loss of individual freedom is involved, this situation would
appear intolerable under due process standards.
Physicians stress the fact that speed is of the essence in the
treatment of the mentally ill person and thus his commitment
should not be slowed by unwarranted legal protections. Also, in
cases where the person manifests dangerous tendencies, hasty confinement is desirable for his protection and the protection of the
community. Many commitment codes have handled this situation
by emergency detention provisions.47 This detention, as opposed to
hospitalization, is a temporary measure for the speedy processing
of emergency situations. Nebraska allows a warrant to be issued
by the county board with suitable custody provided for the potentially dangerous patient until their investigation is complete. The
period for which a person may be held prior to commitment or
release is not stated.48
A second method for dealing with emergency situations is present in the Nebraska statutory scheme. 49 Commitment by medical
certification, by which a person may be admitted to a state hospital upon the certification of two physicians, seems to serve the
same purpose as other emergency provisions but is not supported
by a mandatory hearing after the initial commitment. The patient
must initiate such a hearing process by requesting his release
from the hospital superintendent who, if he feels further detention
is necessary, will ask the county board to commence involuntary
proceedings. The Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Fuller
v. Mullinax,5 0 declared that such commitment was in violation of
due process guarantees. The court based its conclusion primarily
on the fact that under a medical certification procedure, no notice
or opportunity to be heard was present. The court also felt that
these defects were not cured by provisions for subsequent judicial
review or habeas corpus proceedings. 51
The District of Columbia Code provides that a person who exhibits
dangerous tendencies as the apparent result of a mental disorder may
be detained in a hospital for a period of time not exceeding 48 hours
and within that time a hearing must be held to decide whether the
person should be bound over for formal commitment procedures.
D.C. CoDE ANN. § § 21-521 to 21-528.
48 NEs. REv. STAT. § 83-325 (Reissue 1966).
49 NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-322.01 (Reissue 1966).
50 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954). The Missouri statute was virtually
identical with NEB. REV. STAT § 83-322.01 (Reissue 1966) both appearing to have been adopted from the Draft Act § 9.
47

51

However, one authority concludes that the majority of the cases

have held that this type of commitment was valid and the due process requirements were satisfied where adequate appeal provisions
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While commitment by medical certification has been called
merely a non-protesting admission, this would again seem to be
a case of allowing mere labels to save the procedure from due
process defects. 52 If methods are necessary to handle emergency
cases, the procedures should be more clearly defined and adequate
safeguards against abuse included. Medical certification could easily
become a method of bypassing more formal commitment proceedings when no danger in fact exists.
The value of statutory provisions for judicial review and habeas
corpus in civil commitment proceedings is questionable.53 Where
the responsibility for initiating such process rests on the individual,
it is unlikely that the person committed to an institution would be
able to avail himself of such "protections" without the assistance
of counsel.4 Such commitment protections do not adequately protect the rights of those individuals subject to commitment proceedings because such a degree of inaccessibility is present. Thus, the
curative effect of the provision is greatly diminished. Methods
should be developed to insure legal protections to the individual
prior to or at least during the commitment proceedings.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
The effect of a civil commitment proceeding is to place the
individual in direct confrontation with the power and the resources
of the state in an adjudication of his mental status. Realizing that
the result of the adjudication may be the restraint of the individual
against his will in a state mental hospital, the desirability and necessity of the appointment of counsel for the protection of such a
person should be examined. At the present time, the courts of this
country have not required that a person alleged to be mentally ill
be represented by counsel at the commitment hearing, 55 although
are included. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of
Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1959).

See note 15 supra.
53 Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally ILL, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
52

822 (1967).

54 Testifying before the U.S. Senate subcommittee on constitutional
rights, Dr. C. H. Farrell, a member of the Douglas County Board of
Mental Health, stated that while approximately 1,000 persons were
committed to state hospitals for Omaha each year, there had been
no appeals or habeas corpus actions during the ten years he had
served on the board. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1,at 162-63 (1961).
55 Note, The Right to Counsel at
TEMPLE L. QUARTERLY 381 (1967).

Civil Competency Proceedings, 40
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some state legislatures have provided for such representation by

statute. 6

The development of the right to counsel and its extension in
the area of criminal law provides a standard against which we
may examine this question. In a series of decisions culminating in

Miranda v. Arizona,57 the Supreme Court has declared that such
representation is an essential element of due process in criminal
proceedings. Two factors leading the court to this decision, the
inability of an untrained individual to conduct an adequate defense
as against the prosecutor of the state and the serious consequences
which may flow from such an adjudication, are equally applicable
in the area of civil commitment proceedings. Justice Sutherland
in Powell v. Alabama,5 8 has outlined the factors which militate for
the appointment of counsel in criminal proceedings. Pointing out
that even the intelligent layman would be severely handicapped
in the preparation of a defense as the result of no training in the
technique of the science of law, he concluded: "If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant or
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."5 9
Under provisions of the Nebraska commitment code, there
are two preliminary investigations, a preliminary inquiry by the
county board of mental health and an examination by a physician
prior to the actual commitment hearing. Assuming that the purpose of these procedures is to eliminate those initial applications
which have no basis in fact, we can see that by the time the
individual finally reaches the hearing stage, there is a presumption
in the eyes of the county board that he is mentally ill. It is difficult
to see how such a person can be expected to raise relevant issues
in his defense, advance reasons why he should not be committed
to a hospital, or successfully challenge the medical testimony of
the state. Despite protestations of benevolent intent on the part
of the state, the fact remains that the individual receiving an unfavorable determination from the county board is subject to indefinite confinement, perhaps for the rest of his life. Recently the
Supreme Court considered the question of the applicability of
constitutional guarantees, such as assistance of counsel, in juvenile
proceedings.60 With respect to the detention of juveniles, Justice
Fortas stated that "there is no place in our system of laws
for reaching a result of such tremendous consequence without
Lindman and McIntyre 100-03.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59 Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
60 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
56
57
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ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel .... "' This statement may be taken as an effective rebuttal to
those who contend that in civil commitment proceedings, as formerly in juvenile cases, the state is parens patriae rather than
prosecuting attorney and judge and thus not held to standards
of due process. This alleged parental concern for the protection of
the mentally ill gives no adequate basis for the denial of those
rights held by others whose liberty is in question. We have reached
a point in our jurisprudential development that such labels as
"civil" and "criminal" should no longer dictate results where the
adjudication involves individual freedom.
The appointment of counsel in such proceedings would serve
purposes other than protecting the procedural safeguards and substantive due process rights of the individual.6 2 Prior to the hearing,
an appointed attorney would serve as a substitute on whom notice
of the commitment proceedings could be served if, in fact, personal
service on the allegedly mentally ill person would prove harmful. 63
At the hearing the attorney would be able to submit relevant facts
based on independent investigation, cross-examine witnesses, and
arrange for independent psychiatric examination. Post-hearing
appeals will also become a more effective tool in the protection
of individual rights since an adequate record will have been
established.
The Nebraska Legislature has recently amended Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 83-325 and provided for the appointment of counsel in civil
commitment proceedings.6 4 There is some evidence that counsel
has been appointed as a matter of policy by some county boards
of mental health prior to this enactment. 5 The amendment, however, is rather limited in scope. The proposed patient is told at
the hearing that he may request counsel. If the board finds he is
unable to retain counsel, this fact is certified to the district or
county court and counsel appointed. It appears rather paradoxical
to require a person, who the state has reason to believe is mentally
ill, to exercise judgment in determining whether he wishes representation by counsel. Also where the commitment proceeding is
under the direction of the county board, it may also be noted that
the proposed patient may not have notice of such hearing and is
61 Id. at 554.
62 Note, The Right to Counsel at Civil Competency Proceedings, 40
TEMPLE L. QUARTERLY 381, 387 (1967).
63

64

65

See note 46 infra.

NEr. REV. STAT. § § 83-325.01, 83-325.02 and 83.325.03

(Supp. 1967).

Testimony of Dr. C. H. FarrelL Hearing before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, 162-63 (1961).
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not required to be present.66 In essence, he may never have the
opportunity to request the appointment of counsel on his behalf.
Provided, however, that the proposed patient does appear at the
hearing and request such assistance, any counsel appointed at that
time must face a board which has already conducted a preliminary
hearing and medical examination. Being injected into the proceeding at this point, the attorney will immediately be placed on the
defensive. The bill does, however, provide that counsel may have
full access to the proposed patient at all reasonable times, but fails
to state a time period for the preparation of the case.
In the case of commitment by medical certification, the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-325.01 will not apply until the patient
requests discharge and the superintendent institutes involuntary
proceedings against him with the county board. In this situation,
perhaps, counsel appointed after commitment by certification would
be able to request that such involuntary proceedings take place,
thus removing the burden from the patient who in all likelihood
does not even know that he has the right to such a request.
Although there has been no determination that an individual
involved in a civil commitment proceeding has the constitutional
right to representation by counsel, the arguments discussed would
strongly recommend that such appointment be made mandatory
in each case. This fact has been recognized by the legislature by
the passage of the amendment. However, a more comprehensive
provision, better tailored to fit into existing procedures, is required
to fulfill these purposes.
TRIAL BY JURY
Nebraska commitment procedures make no provision for trial
by jury at any stage of the process. 67 Whether a person may request a jury trial to determine his mental status is questionable. 8
In In re Warer's Estate, 69 the Nebraska Supreme Court stated
that it was committed to the view that the applicable section of the
Nebraska Constitution only preserves the right to a jury trial as
it existed at the common law. "The general rule seems to be
that there is no right to a jury trial in proceedings to determine a
See Hearing and Notice supra.
fact, NEB. Rav. STAT. § 83-328.03 (Reissue 1966) which deals with
appeals from the decisions of the county boards, expressly provides
that such appeals shall be heard without a jury.
68 NEB. CowsT. art. I, § 6 provides that: "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate."
69 137 Neb. 25, 288 N.W. 39 (1939).
66

67 In
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person's sanity, except where, as in some jurisdictions, the right
is conferred by statute. ' 70 It may be noted, however, that the court
in this case was dealing with the appointment of a guardian for an
alleged incompetent and not with his commitment to an institution. In In re Simmons,71 the court raises the question of this right
but does not find it necessary to decide the issue. In accompanying
dicta, however, the court seems to be of the view that the right
to a jury trial did exist at common law and suggests that an
72
abridgement of this right by statute would be unconstitutional.
Although the jury trial was one of the earliest methods utilized
to prevent unwarranted commitment the wisdom of its use has
been questioned. During the twenty-five years that Illinois used the
jury trial for all commitments (1867-1893), more sane persons were
declared insane, as shown by reports of state institutions, than
were ever wrongfully committed under the previous method.7 3
Those who object to the use of a jury trial in such procedures
usually base their objection on the fact that laymen are placed
in the position of evaluating expert testimony as to the mental
condition of the proposed patient, a job which it is doubtful they
can handle.7 4 This argument overlooks the fact, however, that the
jury in such a case is not required to make a medical diagnosis of
the allegedly mentally ill person. They are required only to decide,
on the basis of expert medical testimony, whether the condition
of the proposed patient is such that his commitment is justified
7 5
under the statute.
At this time, thirteen jurisdictions authorize the use of a jury
trial to decide the question of hospitalization,"8 although apparently
,only if the proposed patient requests such. It does not appear on
the basis of these considerations that mandatory jury trials in
.civil commitment proceedings would add substantially to protections afforded the allegedly mentally ill person. However, such a
jury determination should be made available to such person upon
his request or upon request made by his counsel.
70

Id. at 30, 288 N.W. at 44.

71 76 Neb. 639, 107 N.W. 863 (1907).
72 For authorities in accord with

this view, see Lindman and McIntyre

73

28, 29.
M. GUTTMACHER AND H.
(1952).

74

Curren, Hospitalization of the Mentally
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11,

31 N.

CAR. L. REv. 275

(1952-53) Curren points out: "The use of a lay jury to determine
such a highly technical question has been compared to calling in the
neighbors to diagnose meningitis or scarlet fever." Id. at 283.
75 Hearings on S. 935 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 185-03 (1963).
16 Lindman and McIntyre 28.
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CONCLUSION
Nebraska's procedures for the civil commitment of the mentally
ill are lacking in protections for the rights of those individuals wha
become involved in the process and thus are constitutionally suspect. The statutes are loosely drafted and unclear as to procedural
steps within the commitment proceedings. It is true that such
procedures are subject to unique problems that are not readily
adaptable to normal judicial processes. It is submitted, however,
that individual liberties need not be subordinate to a workable
commitment process. While medical and legal views of the process
are to a certain extent conflicting, they are by no means mutually
exclusive. An attempt should be made to reconcile the views in
a more suitable code for the state.
Larry L. Langdale '695

